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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
John Lee Adams timely appeals from the district court's order denying his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea. On appeal, Mr. Adams argues that the district court abused
its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
S.A. reported to her pastor that her father, Mr. Adams, had touched her breasts
and genitalia with his hands and lips. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter,
PSI), p.1.) 1 Mr. Adams was charged with lewd conduct with a minor child under the age
of sixteen. (38805 R., pp.15-16.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Adams pleaded
guilty to lewd conduct with a minor child under the age of sixteen. (38805 R., pp.17-19;
02/22/11 Tr., p.6, L.22 - p.7, L.12.)

Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified

sentence of nine years, with two years fixed. (38805 R., pp.38-40.) Mr. Adams timely
filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion requesting leniency, which
was denied by the district court.

(38805 R., pp.41-42.) 2 Mr. Adams timely appealed

from both the judgment of conviction and the order denying his Rule 35 motion. (38805
R., pp.49-51.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed both the district court's judgment of
conviction and its order denying Mr. Adams' Rule 35 motion.

State v. Adams, 2012

Unpublished Opinion 380 (Ct. App. March 1, 2012).

1

The PSI contains various attachments. For ease of citation, the PSI and attachments
have been numbered, beginning with the cover of the April 4, 2011 PSI and ending on
rage 74.
See augmentation in docket number 38805.
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While that appeal was pending, Mr. Adams filed a motion to withdraw his guilty
plea.

(R., pp.8-11.) The district court appointed counsel, held a hearing, and denied

Mr. Adams' motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
appealed. (R., pp.24-28.)

2

(R., pp.21-23.)

Mr. Adams timely

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Adams' motion to withdraw
his guilty plea?

3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Adams' Motion To
Withdraw His Guilty Plea

A.

Standard Of Review
Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a plea is limited to

determining

whether the

district

distinguished from arbitrary action.

court exercised

sound

judicial

discretion

as

State v. Freeman, 110 Idaho 117, 121 (Ct. App.

1986).

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Adams' Motion To
Withdraw His Guilty Plea
Motions for withdrawal of pleas are governed by I.C.R. 33(c). Whether to grant a

motion to withdraw a guilty plea lies in the discretion of the district court and such
discretion should be liberally applied. Freeman, 110 Idaho at 121. After a defendant
has been sentenced, a motion to withdraw a guilty plea generally will be granted only to
correct manifest injustice. Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c); State v. Huffman, 137 Idaho 886,
887 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 361 (Ct. App. 1997). It is the
defendant's burden to show that a manifest injustice would result if the motion to
withdraw the guilty plea were denied. State v. Gomez, 124 Idaho 177, 178 (Ct. App.
1993).

Manifest injustice will be found if the plea was not taken in compliance with

constitutional due process standards, which require that a guilty plea be entered
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. Huffman, 137 Idaho at 887; Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).

4

Mr. Adams contends he did not knowingly enter his guilty plea because he was
not fully informed by his trial attorney about the implications of his guilty plea. 3 At the
hearing on the motion to withdraw Mr. Adams' guilty plea, his trial counsel clarified that
Mr. Adams was claiming that he did not understand the implications of his guilty plea
because his prior counsel did not spend enough time with him prior to the change of
plea hearing. (02/27 /12 Tr., p.11, Ls.18-11.) Due to that deficiency, Mr. Adams was
uncertain as to "what exactly the charges were and the punishments, partly because of
medical procedures and partly because of the lack of time he feels his previous attorney
had spent with him."4 (02/27/12 Tr., p.11, Ls.23-p.12, L.5.)
Mr. Adams asserts he was not of sound mind during the plea negotiations and
during the events which lead up to sentencing because of medical problems he had
been experiencing in the years leading up to this case.

(R., p.8.)

Specifically,

Mr. Adams had a "hole" in his heart and six blood clots "on the brain." (R., p.9.)

In

March of 2010, Mr. Adams underwent heart surgery and was recovering from that when
he found out about the blood clots and the criminal charges in this matter. (R., p.9.) At
the time of the initial police investigation, Mr. Adams was suffering from these health
issues.

(R., pp.8-9.)

These medical problems inhibited his ability to understand the

police interrogators questions and his attorney's advice prior to the change of plea
hearing. (R., pp.8-9.)
The transcripts of the change of plea hearing and the sentencing hearing provide
support for the claim that Mr. Adams did not understand the implications and nature of

3

Mr. Adams is not asserting that his trial counsel was ineffective. He is merely
explaining the reasons why he did not understand the implications of pleading guilty.
4 Mr. Adams recognizes that he correctly told the district court that his offense carried
the possibility of life in prison and a $50,000.00 fine at the change of plea hearing.
(02/22/11 Tr., p.11, Ls.7-16.)
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his guilty plea. At the change of plea hearing, Mr. Adams informed the district court that
he suffers from a learning disability, which inhibits his ability to understand the English
language. (02/22/11 Tr., p.9, Ls.19-25.) At that hearing, Mr. Adams was asked if was
on probation and responded "[f]rom work sir .... " (02/22/11 Tr., p.10, Ls.10-11.) After
clarifying what it meant by probation, the district court had to explain to Mr. Adams the
difference between a binding and nonbinding guilty plea.

(02/22/11 Tr., p.11, L.25 -

p.12, L.11.) At the sentencing hearing, the district court asked Mr. Adams if he could
explain what a nonbinding plea agreement meant, and Mr. Adams replied "that at any
time it could be changed or not. It could be dropped." (04/18/11 Tr., p.22, Ls.7-12.)
The district court re-explained the definition of a non-binding plea agreement because it
was obviously unsatisfied with Mr. Adams' understanding of the nature of a nonbinding
plea agreement. (04/18/11 Tr., p.22, Ls.13-19.) After it imposed a unified sentence of
nine years, with two years fixed, Mr. Adams told the district court that he did not
understand his sentence.

(04/18/11 Tr., p.41, Ls.14-17, p.43, Ls.17-20.) The district

court responded by asking Mr. Adams' trial counsel to "sit down and help explain what
the Court has done today." (04/18/11 Tr., p.43, Ls.21-22.)
Mr. Adams did not understand the nature of the charges to which he was
pleading guilty. When asked for a factual basis for his plea, Mr. Adams said he fondled
his daughter. (02/22/11 Tr., p.16, Ls.14-24.) The district court then asked if Mr. Adams
was using the term "fondle" to mean touching of a sexual nature. (02/22/11 Tr., p.16,
L.25 - p.17, L.1.) Mr. Adams said no to that question. (02/22/11 Tr., p.17, L.2.) The
district court then asked if any of the touching was "done with the intent to gratify your
sexual [desires]." Mr. Adams again answered no. (02/22/11 Tr., p.17, Ls.8-11.) After
talking with counsel off the record, Mr. Adams then admitted that he touched his
6

daughter with the intent to gratify his sexual desire. (02/22/11 Tr., p.17, L.13 - p.18,
L.6.) Mr. Adams did not fully understand the offense required the touching to be for the
purpose of sexual gratification.

Moreover, Mr. Adams' learning disability and his

medical problems prevented him from understanding the questions posited by the
psychosexual evaluator.

(R., pp.9-10.)

In fact, Mr. Adams' wife was asked by the

evaluator to explain the questions to him. (R., pp.9-10.)
Additionally, Mr. Adams' guilty plea was not voluntary because he was suffering
from severe heart and brain infirmities which undermined his ability to voluntarily enter a
guilty plea. (R., pp.8-9.) Mr. Adams told the police interrogator about his health issues.
(R., p.9.)

The interrogator continued to question Mr. Adams for hours.

(R., p.9.)

Mr. Adams repeatedly denied the alleged conduct, but eventually broke down and was
coerced by the investigator to admit to the criminal conduct. (R., p.9.) Mr. Adams also
argued that his trial counsel told him that the prosecutor would eat him alive if he did not
enter a guilty plea. (R., p.9.) Mr. Adams said that his attorney convinced him to give up
his claim of innocence and plead guilty. (R., p.9.) Mr. Adams also stated that he was
"terrified" at the change of plea hearing. (R., p.9.)
Based upon the above information, Mr. Adams asserts the district court abused
its discretion in failing to grant his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because his guilty
plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Adams respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
denying his motion to withdraw guilty plea and remand his case for further proceedings.
DATED this 19th day of April, 2013.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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